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WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
Roni A. Elias+
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, the federal regulation of water pollution has been a vital part
of the movement to improve the environment. The Clean Water Act1 (“CWA”) was the
first federal legislation that gave the federal government direct authority to regulate conduct for the purpose of controlling and preventing water pollution. Its enactment was a
vital step in creating uniform national policy to protect water quality and assure the longterm vitality of the most vital of our natural resources.
The scope of federal authority to regulate conduct that causes water pollution is defined by the concept of the “waters of the United States.” Simply put, there is extensive,
long-standing legal support for the principle that the federal government has both the constitutional and statutory authority to take measures to prevent the pollution of the “waters
of the United States.”2 By the same token, however, there is also extensive legal authority
supporting the proposition that state and local governments have the primary responsibility–and power–to regulate land and water use within their borders, and basic constitutional
principles of federalism require that the federal government. 3 At the core of this jurisdictional problem is identifying where the water ends and the land begins. As the Supreme
Court noted in a decision applying the CWA nearly thirty years ago, this problem is not
an easy one to solve.4
The difficulty of finding the jurisdictional boundary between land and water has
been increased by the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on CWA jurisdiction in Rapanos v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.5 In that case, the Court issued three
opinions about who had the authority to define this boundary and about what legal principles should guide the definition. None of these three disparate views commanded a majority of the Court. Consequently, substantial uncertainty remains about how to determine the
outer limits of federal jurisdiction to prevent pollution in the “waters of the United States.”

+ I am so blessed & greatly appreciate the love of my life, M.G.S, for her enduring support and continuously making me a better person every day! This Article is dedicated to my parents, Dr.'s Aida & Adil Elias, my
First Great Teachers In Life. I am truly grateful to the best brother anyone could be blessed to have, my brother,
Pierre. To the Tulsa Law Review, a heartfelt thank you and gratitude for your efforts, and laser sharp attention to
detail.
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1948).
2. See infra § III.
3. See id.
4. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 n. 8 (1985).
5. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
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The two federal agencies charged with enforcing the CWA, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”)
have recently promulgated regulations revising the regulatory definition of “waters of the
United States,” and thereby defining the limits of federal authority under the Clean Water
Act.6 The regulations purport to incorporate the legal principles set forth in Rapanos, as
well as prior case law, but there are substantial questions about whether the proposed regulations are, in fact, consistent with established law or whether they reflect an attempt to
extend the legal boundaries of federal jurisdiction beyond what courts have previously
approved and what the CWA and the constitution would allow. Those questions are currently being considered by the Sixth Circuit, which has issued a stay of the implementation
of the proposed regulations while it considers challenges to them asserted by several state
governments.7
This paper argues that the regulations proposed last year are inconsistent with established law, including both the text of the CWA itself and the constitutional limits on federal authority to regulate land and water use. The body of law regarding the federal authority to regulate water use has always depended upon the proposition that the federal
government may only regulate those bodies of water that have a regular, tangible, physical
connection to waters that can be used in interstate navigation. 8 The regulations proposed
by the EPA and the Army Corps go far beyond that limitation, extending federal authority
over virtually the entire ecosystem that can affect the navigable waters, which includes
virtually all of the land and water in every corner of the United States. As promulgated,
these regulations would make the EPA and the Army Corps the primary regulators of land
and water use throughout the United States, and their regulatory authority would be exercised only with regard to whether such uses would prevent or contribute to water pollution.
While the prevention of water pollution is certainly a vitally important consideration, it
cannot and must not be the only consideration in regulating land and water use in all of the
diverse communities and localities across the country. State and local governments must
retain their traditional leading role in regulating land and water use.
This paper makes this argument in Part I by outlining the regulations proposed by
the EPA and the Army Corps in 2015 and identifying the principal criticisms of those
regulations. In Part II, it reviews the statutory framework of the CWA, which creates the
authority for the agencies to define the “waters of the United States.” In Part III, this paper
examines how case law, both before and after the CWA, has defined the scope of federal
authority to regulate water use, and it notes that, until the new regulations, federal law has
always recognized that the federal government may only regulate waters that have a significant, physical connection to the navigable waters. Finally, in Part IV, it more closely
examines the main arguments against the legality of the new regulations and demonstrates
that those regulations are both bad law and bad policy.

6. See generally, Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, 80 FED. REG. 37054, 3705657 (2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328 and scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.).
7. See Ohio v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2015).
8. See infra § III.
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THE NEW REGULATORY DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” AND ITS
CRITICS

I.

In 2015, the EPA and the Army Corps promulgated a new regulatory definition of
the “waters of the United States” that was guided by the ruling in Rapanos, as well as by
policy and scientific considerations. 9 The general objective of the regulation was to provide more predictable agency decision-making about which kinds of waters and wetlands
would fall within federal jurisdiction.10 Thus, the regulatory definition established certain
categories of waters that would always fall within CWA jurisdiction, and it sought to diminish the circumstances under which jurisdictional decisions would turn on case-specific
factors.11 In addition, the agencies sought to incorporate a concept that had been crucial
in the most recent Supreme Court decisions on the limits of federal power under the CWA:
the idea that the CWA only authorized the federal government to regulate bodies of water
or other environmental features that had a “significant nexus” with interstate waters that
were actually navigable or were capable of being modified to accommodate navigation. 12
As the agencies explained when first publishing the regulation:
The first three types of jurisdictional waters, traditional navigable
waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas, are jurisdictional by rule
in all cases. The fourth type of water, impoundments of jurisdictional
waters, is also jurisdictional by rule in all cases. The next two types of
waters, ‘‘tributaries’’ and ‘‘adjacent’’ waters, are jurisdictional by rule,
as defined, because the science confirms that they have a significant
nexus to traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas.
For waters that are jurisdictional by rule, no additional analysis is required.
The final two types of jurisdictional waters are those waters found
after a case-specific analysis to have a significant nexus to traditional
navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas, either alone or
in combination with similarly situated waters in the region. Justice Kennedy acknowledged the agencies could establish more specific regulations or establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis, and for
these waters the agencies will continue to assess significant nexus on a
case-specific basis.13
The new regulations employed this concept of “significant nexus” to include a broad category of “waters,” many of which had not previously been included within the concept of
“waters of the United States.” For example, the regulations extended federal jurisdiction
to “all tributaries” to interstate waters and the territorial seas, with “tributary” defined to
mean a water that contributes any “flow” whatsoever, “either directly or through another
water,” to an actual interstate or navigable water, and that “is characterized by the presence

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, supra note 6, at 37056-57.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 37060-61.
Id. at 37058.
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of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark,” and without regard to various constructed or natural breaks. 14 Given this definition, something
could constitute a “tributary” even if it was “intermittent[ ] or ephemeral.” 15 Moreover,
the “flow” required to meet the definitional requirements for a tributary need not go directly to a navigable water. The new regulations contemplate that “to meet the rule’s definition of ‘tributary,’ a water must flow directly or through another water or waters to a
traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.” 16 That is, “[a] tributary
may contribute flow through any number of downstream waters, including non-jurisdictional features. . . .”17 Thus, “non-jurisdictional features”—–things that were within the
traditional province of state and local authority—–could still fall within federal jurisdiction
if there was even an intermittent flow of water through them that was related to a flow of
water that reached a navigable body of water.
The new regulations also found a “significant nexus” between the navigable waters
and wetlands or other “waters” that were “adjacent” to the navigable waters.18 Thus, the
regulations defined “waters of the United States” to include “[a]ll waters adjacent to” any
traditional navigable or interstate water, and to any “tributary” as so defined by the new
regulations.19 The new regulations further defined “adjacent” to mean not only “bordering,” or “contiguous,” but also “neighboring.” 20 “Neighboring” was defined to include not
only “[a]ll waters within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark” of such a water, as well
as “[a]ll waters” within 1,500 feet of the “ordinary high water mark of such water” and
within the 100-year floodplain of such water and “all waters” within 1,500 feet of the
ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes, or of the high tide line of a traditional navigable waterway or territorial sea.21 The new regulations also noted that “[t]he entire water
is neighboring if a portion is located within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark and
within the 100-year floodplain.”22
Through their expansive definition of “tributary” and their broadly drawn concept
of adjacency, the new regulations would extend federal jurisdiction to “waters” and other
features that are dry land most of the time, even when these feature are located as far as
1,500 feet from even “ephemeral” creek beds that are usually dry. The new regulations
also would have potentially extended CWA jurisdiction to “[a]ll waters” within the 100year floodplain of a traditional navigable or interstate water or territorial sea and to “all
waters located within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark” of any
such water or of a “tributary” if “they are determined on a case-specific basis to have a
significant nexus” to a traditional navigable or interstate water or territorial sea. 23 To be

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(3) (1986).
Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, supra note 6, at 37076.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(6) (1986).
See id.
33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1) (1986).
33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(2) (1986).
Id.
See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(8) (1986).
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sure the new regulation excludes a few such things as certain swimming pools (those “created in dry land”) and “puddles” (defined as “very small, shallow, and highly transitory
pool[s] of water that form[s] on pavement or uplands during or immediately after a rainstorm or similar precipitation event”).24 Even so, the new regulations greatly expanded
federal jurisdiction over a number of areas that had long been considered within the exclusive province of state and local government. Moreover, the regulations also gave the
Army Corps and the EPA extensive discretion to define a wide variety of environmental
features as falling within the scope of CWA jurisdiction.
The new regulatory definition was hardly acclaimed as a solution to the long-standing problem of establishing reasonable and cognizable limits to CWA jurisdiction. The
attorneys general of Ohio and Michigan sued the Army Corps in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio immediately after the issuance of the rule, alleging
generally that the new definition of “waters of the United States” exceeded the authority
conveyed by the CWA and was inconsistent with the principles upon which Supreme
Court opinions such as SWANCC and Rapanos were based.25 In particular, the attorneys
general were concerned with the intrusion of federal power into areas previously reserved
for state and local authority, especially the regulation of land use and intrastate waters. 26
In this connection, they expressed concern that the regulations would give the federal government the power to inappropriately supplant state and local authority. Their complaint
expressed this concern in terms of an example of an Ohio or Michigan property owner
who wanted to fix “a depression in her yard that can fill with water in heavy rains.”27 They
noted that, under the new regulations, this ordinary home repair could come within federal
jurisdiction and be subject to the federal permitting process “should the area be in a floodplain and anywhere within 1,500 feet of even a usually dry stream bed that can be deemed
to connect with some other such feature that connects somehow with other similar land
features that may on occasion take water to a tributary of a river or lake that actually is a
navigable or interstate water.”28
The lawsuit by Michigan and Ohio coincided by legal actions taken by other states
and private groups, all of which challenged the legality of the proposed regulations. 29 In
general, all of these lawsuits involved allegations that the regulations purported to create
federal authority beyond the limits permitted by the text of the CWA and the Constitution.30 To understand whether and to what extent these allegations make a compelling case
against the legality of the new definition of “waters of the United States,” it is necessary
to consider the framework of the CWA.

24. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(b)(4)(iii) (1986) (vii); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(2)(iv)(C) (1980),(G); Clean Water
Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, supra note 6 at 37099.
25. See Complaint, Ohio v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, Case No. 2:15-cv-02467 (S.D. Ohio),
available at http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Briefing-Room/News-Releases/Environmental-Enforcement/2015-06-29-WOTUS-Complaint-%28as-filed%29.aspx.
26. Id. at 42-49.
27. Id. at ¶ 7.
28. Id.
29. See Ohio v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2015).
30. See id.
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THE CWA’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The CWA was the product of evolving federal legislation designed to protect the
navigability of interstate waters. The first precursor of the CWA and the first federal legislation designed to promote clean water was the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.31 In this
legislation, Congress sought to prevent the discharge of trash into navigable waterways. 32
The Rivers and Harbors Act contemplated water pollution as a threat to navigation–not as
a threat to environmental quality–because using rivers, harbors, and bays as waste disposal
sites obstructed waterways that were essential for both commercial and military purposes.33 Thus, the Rivers and Harbors Act was tailored to permit the federal government
to prevent such obstructions to the waterways that could be used for navigation.
The first federal legislation to address pollution as a problem of environmental quality was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (“FWCPA”). 34 Under this statutory scheme, the federal government would fund research regarding water pollution and
would provide loans that states could use to build water treatment plants. 35 Through this
statutory scheme, the FWCPA reflected the traditional understanding of water resource
management as a function of state government; it placed the primary responsibility for
pollution control with state authorities, and the federal government only provided research
and funding that facilitated the development of state policies and programs for managing
water pollution. Unfortunately, the FWCPA was not terribly effective at promoting better
water pollution control. Even with amendments gratfted on to the legislation after its initial
enactment, the FWCPA proved largely ineffective, as water quality did not significantly
improve as a result of its program. 36
The need for more effective water pollution policies became a particular focus of
public and political attention in the late 1960s, with the burgeoning environmental movement and the occurrence of two highly publicized environmental disasters affecting water
resources. In January 1969, a “blowout” beneath an oil-drilling platform off the California
coast near Santa Barbara sent over 3 million gallons of crude oil into the Pacific Ocean,
resulting in “waves so thick with crude oil that they broke on shore with an eerie silence.
Thirty miles of sandy beaches coated with thick sludge. Hundreds of miles of ocean covered with an oily black sheen.”37 Six months later, an oil slick on the surface of the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland caught fire, damaging two bridges, and the news coverage of that

31. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, Ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000)).
32. See JOEL M. GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER ACT 5 (2005).
33. Id.
34. P.L. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155.
35. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 32, at 5-6.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Miles Corwin, The Oil Spill Heard ‘Round the Country!, L.A. TIMES, January 28, 1989, at I23,
http://www2.bren.ucsb.edu/~dhardy/1969_Santa_Barbara_Oil_Spill/Home.html.
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event provided a dramatic accent to the problems of water pollution. 38 Indeed, Cleveland’s
“burning river” even became the subject of a popular song. 39
In the wake of these events, and the inaugural Earth Day in 1970, a subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Public Works convened hearings on the problem of water
pollution.40 In 1972, relying on the Senate Committee’s findings, Congress amended the
FWPCA to authorize more direct federal action addressing water pollution. 41 President
Nixon vetoed these amendments, but Congress overrode the veto, and the amended
FWPCA became known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).42
Congress announced the policy objectives behind the CWA in its text, and the text
of the CWA also focused on the concept as “navigable waters” as the subject of federal
regulation. At the most fundamental level, the CWA was intended to “restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”43 Congress sought
to achieve this overarching objective by reaching certain specifically enumerated goals,
which included, among things: eliminating the discharge of pollution into the “navigable
waters” of the United States by 1985;44 prohibiting the discharge of “toxic pollutants in
toxic amounts;”45 providing federal financial assistance to the construction of publicly
owned wastewater treatment facilities;46 promoting the development and implementation
of “waste treatment management planning processes” in every state; 47 funding research
and the development of technology “necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into
the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans;”48 developing and
implementing “programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution . . . in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both
point and nonpoint sources of pollution.”49
Towards these objectives, the CWA prohibited any discharge of pollutants into navigable waters without certain permits. 50 The required permits were available through two
programs that were created by the CWA: the “National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System” (“NPDES”)51; and “permits for dredged or fill material,” commonly known as

38. MICHAEL ROTMAN, CUYAHOGA RIVER FIRE, available athttp://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show/63#.
VY7MNGCprzI (last accessed June 27, 2015) Some of the most sensational publicity about the Cuyahoga
River Fire came from Time Magazine, which reported on the 1969 fire and on water pollution issues generally
in its issue of August 1, 1969. That issue featured a photograph of the burning Cuyahoga River on the cover;
but the photograph was actually from a fire that occurred there in 1952; Jonathan Adler, The Fable of the
Burning River, 45 Years Later, WASH. POST, June 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost .com /news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/06/22/the-fable-of-the-burning-river-45-years-later.
39. Randy Newman, Burn On, SAIL AWAY (1972).
40. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 32, at 6.
41. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 2-7 (1993).
42. Id. at 2; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 32, at 6.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1948).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1948)
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1948)
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1948)
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (1948)
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1948)
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (1948)
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1948)
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1948)
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“Section 404 permits.”52 Through this regulatory framework, the CWA essentially established two categories of water pollution: the discharge of pollutants, such as toxic substances, into water; and the placement of “dredged or fill material” into water. Federal
regulations define “dredged material” as “material that is excavated or dredged from waters of the United States.”53 Those regulations also define “fill material” as material that
“[r]eplac[es] any portion of a water of the United States with dry land” 54 or that
“[c]hang[es] the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.” 55
The two different kinds of permits are issued by separate federal agencies. The CWA
gave the EPA primary authority over NPDES permits, and it created a mechanism by
which the EPA can delegate its NPDES permitting authority to state agencies. 56 Permits
relating to “dredged or fill material” fall within the authority of the Army Corps.57
III. THE INTERPRETATION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” BEFORE AND AFTER
THE CWA
A.

The Established Understanding of the Limits of Federal Power over Water
Resources When the CWA Was Enacted

Of course, the definition of “waters of the United States” for the purposes of the
CWA does not occur in a vacuum. There is an extensive history of the federal regulation
of certain waters in the United States, and this history necessarily informs the interpretation of the operative concepts in the CWA and its attendant regulations. A review of the
historical use of the concept of “waters of the United States” reveals that the term has
traditionally applied to waters that were actually capable of being used in navigation and
their tributaries that had a significant flow into such navigable waters.
Because the terms “waters of the United States” and “navigable waters” are legal
terms of art, Congress’ use of these terms in the CWA creates a presumption that, in the
context of the statute, these terms incorporated this established judicial meaning. 58 Congress’ regulation of the “navigable waters” and the “waters of the United States” is a function of the authority granted to it under the Commerce Clause. 59 It is axiomatic that the

52. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1948)
53. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(c) (1986).
54. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(1)(i) (1986).
55. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(1)(ii) (1986). The substances that constitute “fill material” include, but are not limited to: “rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other excavation activities, and materials used to create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the United States.”
33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(2) (1986). “The term fill material does not include trash or garbage.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(3)
(1986).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1948) For a state to obtain authority to issue permits under this program, the governor must submit to the Administrator of the EPA a description of the proposed program and “a statement from
the attorney general . . . that the laws of such State, or the interstate compact[,] . . . provide adequate authority to
carry out the described program. The Administrator shall approve each . . . program unless he deter- mines that
adequate authority does not exist.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1948)
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1948).
58. Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989) (“[w]hen Congress codifies a judicially
defined concept, it is presumed, absent an express statement to the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt the
interpretation placed on that concept by the courts.”); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
696-97 (1979).
59. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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federal government has the constitutional authority “to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the United States” as an aspect of its power
to regulate interstate commerce.60 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that “the jurisdiction
of the general government over interstate commerce and its natural highways vests in that
government the right to take all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable water courses of the country.”61 The collection of navigable water courses is understood as an essentially unitary system, being described by the Court as a “continued highway” that is essential to the continuation and development of interstate commerce. 62
In regulating this “continued highway,” the federal government’s primary objective
is to prevent “any interference with the country’s water assets” and to assure that the navigable waters always have a sufficient flow of water to permit their use in interstate commerce.63 The need to protect the flow of water throughout the entire system of navigable
waters means that federal authority over navigable waters may extend to non-navigable
waters, such as tributaries of navigable waters, that are physically connected to the navigable waters and that are capable of being actually navigable in the future, through improvements that are reasonably anticipated in the ordinary course of events. 64 In addition,
the federal government may regulate those tributaries of navigable waters that are not navigable now and not anticipated to become navigable, but only to the extent necessary to
protect the capacity and integrity of the channels of navigation. 65 In this way, the concept
of the “navigable waters” and the “waters of the United States” has always presupposed
some degree of federal authority over bodies of water that exist entirely within state boundaries.
Because this aspect of federal regulatory power has the potential to intrude upon
state prerogatives, it has always been accepted that the extension of federal authority over
non-navigable bodies of water must be limited so that it does not intrude upon state power
to regulate water. Federal courts have long recognized that the general power to regulate
water use is an essential aspect of the sovereign power of state governments.66 The states
retain “total authority over [their] internal waters,” except where the federal government
has specifically reserved enumerated regulatory power, such as the power to regulate navigation.67 But even here, the extension of federal authority must be carefully drawn to
avoid unnecessary incursions upon the states’ primary power to regulate land and water
use.68 Thus, the federal government can regulate intrastate waters only as necessary to
protect the integrity of the aquatic system that constitutes the navigable waters.69
60. Id.
61. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
62. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1870).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405-08 (1940).
64. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563; Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 406.
65. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941); see also United States v.
Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960).
66. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1977); United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950).
67. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978) (citing Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
at 709).
68. California, 438 U.S. at 645.
69. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 423-26 (discussing federal authority to regulate hydroelectric
power plants in light of their effect on the flow of water in the navigable waters); see also United States v. Gerlach
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The text of the CWA makes it clear that Congress understood this legal background,
which established that its power to regulate the “navigable waters” and the “waters of the
United States” was limited and that it could not be defined so that it intruded upon the
inherent, sovereign power of state governments to regulate the use of property and the use
of water. In its introductory section, where it defines its fundamental policies and objectives, the CWA makes it clear that it is not intended to intrude on state sovereignty. Thus,
the CWA provides:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate
quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the further policy of
Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or
abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by any
State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to
develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources.70
The CWA and the legal background against which it is written mean that the concepts of “navigable waters” and “waters of the United States” are definitely limited in
scope. The historical use of these terms and the language of the CWA itself both establish
unequivocally that “waters of the United States” cannot be read to mean “any water in the
United States.” Rather, that term, and its companion term, “navigable waters” refer to bodies of water that can be navigated or that affect the navigability of bodies of water that can
be navigated. In other words, the CWA regulates waters that are actually navigable and
their significant tributaries. By the same token, the CWA cannot be read to apply to bodies
of water that do not have a substantial effect on the navigable waters and their tributaries.
B.

The Evolution of CWA Regulations and the Gradual Expansion of Federal
Authority

The regulations attendant to the CWA initially reflected a keen appreciation of the
importance of the traditional concept of “waters of the United States” in defining CWA
jurisdiction. In the immediate aftermath of the CWA’s enactment, the regulations provided
that the CWA applied only to waters that were navigable in fact. 71 In 1975, however, the
Army Corps issued interim final regulations redefining “waters of the United States” to
include not only actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate
waters and their tributaries, and non-navigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could
affect interstate commerce.72 Thus, the limits of CWA jurisdiction appeared to coincide
with the limits of Congress’ commerce power. 73

Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (discussing federal authority to regulate water use in connection with the
reclamation of water resources in arid western states, in light of the nexus between those reclamation projects
and the preservation of the flow of water in interstate waters); see generally, Roderick E. Walston, The Federal
Commerce and Navigation Powers: Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County’s Undecided Constitutional
Issue, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699 (2002).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1948).
71. 40 FED. REG. 31320 (1975).
72. Id.
73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723-24 (discussing the evolution of the jurisdictional regulations under the CWA).
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As a part of this extension of CWA jurisdiction, the Army Corps construed the CWA
to cover all “freshwater wetlands” that were adjacent to other covered waters. 74 The regulations defined a “freshwater wetland” as an area that is “periodically inundated” and is
“normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions for growth and reproduction.”75 In 1977, the Corps refined its definition of wetlands
by eliminating the reference to periodic inundation and making other minor changes. 76
This definition has persisted in substance.77
Eventually, the Army Corps sought to extend its regulation to areas whose connection to the navigable waters was more intangible. Specifically, the regulations were broadened to that the “waters of the United States” was defined to include any water that would
serve as a habitat for migratory birds.78 In addition, the Army Corps interpreted its own
regulations to include “ephemeral streams” and “drainage ditches” as “tributaries” that are
part of the “waters of the United States,”79, as long as they have a perceptible “ordinary
high water mark.”80
C.

The Supreme Court’s Correction of the Expansion of CWA Regulatory Authority

As CWA jurisdiction expanded to apply to apply beyond the navigable waters and
their significant tributaries, questions arose about whether the EPA and Army Corps were
exceeding the boundaries of federal power. In particular, these questions arose in cases
where the asserted federal jurisdiction was founded on the concept of “adjacency” to navigable waters and their tributaries. These questions were most prominently considered in
two cases in the Supreme Court, which established the principle that a non-navigable water
could fall within CWA jurisdiction only when that water had a substantial physical connection with a navigable water.
The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.81 There, a developer sought to fill eighty
acres of low-lying marshy land in Michigan near Lake St. Clair. 82 This circumstance implicated the regulatory definition of “wetland” and the question whether federal jurisdiction was limited to wetlands that were inundated by flooding from bodies of navigable
water.83
In Riverside Bayview, the Sixth Circuit had held that the regulatory definition of
wetlands should be construed to include only wetlands that were subject to flooding by

74. See id.
75. See id. (discussing 33 CFR § 209.120(d)(2)(h) (1976)).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 51 FED. REG. 41217.
79. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725 (discussing 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(5) (1986)).
80. Id. (citing 65 FED. REG. 12823 (2000)).
81. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
82. Id. at 123-24. Lake St. Clair is a large inland lake, northeast of Detroit, lying between Lake Huron and
Lake Erie, and it is connected to Lake Erie by the Detroit River. It is bounded by both Michigan and Ontario,
Canada. There was no dispute in the case that Lake St. Clair was a waterway that could be a part of interstate
and/or international commerce.
83. Id.
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adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vegetation.84 According to the Sixth Circuit, any more expansive definition of wetlands might
result in the taking of private property without just compensation.85 The Sixth Circuit also
took the position that, when enacting the CWA, Congress intended only to allow regulation
of wetlands that were the result of flooding by navigable waters.86 Consequently, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the property at issue was not within CWA jurisdiction because its
semiaquatic characteristics were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby navigable waters.87
In reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court first considered whether
the Army Corps had the authority under the CWA to promulgate a regulation that defined
“waters of the United States” to be a wetland adjacent to a navigable water. 88 It began its
answer by noting that CWA jurisdiction must extend beyond the waters that were actually
navigable, and that such jurisdiction must include non-navigable tributaries that fed the
navigable waters “because the discharge of pollutants must be controlled at its source.”89
The Court concluded that the CWA could apply to non-navigable waters and to wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters because all of these were part of a hydrologic system that
determined the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the navigable waters.90
Thus, the Court reiterated the basic principle governing the extension of federal authority
over non-navigable waters, including purely intrastate waters – that such waters could be
regulated to the extent that they had a substantial physical connection to navigable waters
so that pollutants in them would flow to the navigable waters.
The Court also considered whether, for the purpose of applying the applicable regulation, the source of water that inundated a wetland was relevant to determining whether
it was “adjacent” to a navigable water.91 The Court’s answer to the first question determined its answer to the second question. Because “wetlands may affect the water quality
of adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even when the waters of those bodies do not actually
inundate the wetlands,” the Riverside Bayview Court concluded that adjacent wetlands
were covered by the CWA, regardless of the source of water that made them wetlands, as
long as such waters were “inseparably bound up” with the navigable waters.92 Here again,
the Court emphasized the importance of close, tangible, physical connection between the
navigable waters and any regulated waters.
The Riverside Bayview Court noted an important limitation on its holding, which
arose from the unique circumstances of the wetlands adjacent to Lake St. Clair, an open
body of navigable water: “[w]e are not called upon to address the question of the authority
of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 396-97.
Id.
Id.
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-34.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 134-35
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bodies of open water.”93 The Court also noted that it would not be easy to decide the
question of where to draw the boundary between waters that were regulated by the CWA
and purely intrastate waters, not to mention the boundary between “waters of the United
States” and intrastate land. In identifying this difficult question, the Court keenly anticipated the nature of the problem that would be at the center of jurisprudence about CWA
jurisdiction in the coming decades:
In determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges under the
Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends
and land begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no
easy task: the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or
even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between open waters and dry land
may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs—in short, a huge
array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short
of being dry land. Where on this continuum to find the limit of “waters”
is far from obvious.94
In 2001, the Court built upon the principles set forth in Riverside Bayview when it
issued its next significant decision regarding the scope of authority under the CWA in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs
(“SWANCC”).95 There, the Court considered whether the Army Corps had the authority
under the CWA to promulgate a regulation that extended CWA jurisdiction over isolated
inland ponds.96 In answering this question, the Court established a category of intrastate
waters that was categorically excluded from federal authority.
The particular regulation at issue in the case was the so-called “Migratory Bird
Rule,”97 which defined the waters of the United States to include any water that actually
served or that might serve as a habitat for migratory birds or endangered species. 98 The
regulation was triggered when a county waste disposal agency in Illinois, the Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County, purchased an abandoned mining site to use as a disposal
location for nonhazardous solid wastes.99 The property included some permanent and seasonal “ponds” that had been formed when water filled man-made holes created in connection with the former mining operations.100
The agency wanted to fill the ponds, but the Army Corps asserted federal jurisdiction
under the CWA because the ponds were habitats for migratory birds. 101 The agency sued,
challenging the legality of the Migratory Bird Rule, and arguing that the CWA did not
give the Army Corps authority over isolated, man-made ponds that happened to be wildlife
habitats.102 The Army Corps maintained that, under Riverside Bayview, the CWA should
be read to give it regulatory authority over any body of water, as long as such regulation
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131 n. 8.
Id. at 132.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County,531 U.S. at 159.
Id. at 168-69.
51 FED. REG. 41217.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 164.
Id. at 162-63.
Id.
Id. at 164-65.
Id.
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was undertaken for the same general ecological purposes of the CWA, such as maintaining
the biological integrity of aquatic systems. 103
The SWANCC Court rejected the Army Corps’ arguments and ruled that the Migratory Bird Rule was invalid because it exceeded the scope of regulatory authority created
by the CWA.104 The Court reasoned that fundamental purpose of the CWA was to protect
waters and aquatic ecosystems, including wetlands, which had a “significant nexus” with
navigable waters.105 It is clear that SWANCC’s concept of “significant nexus” is derived
from the idea expressed in Riverside Bayview that the CWA covered only waters that were
“inseparably bound up” with “navigable waters.”106 Because the isolated ponds at issue in
SWANCC did not have this kind of connection to navigable waters, the Court held that
they could not be regulated by the Army Corps.
But, even more fundamentally, the Court held that the Army Corps lacked the authority to promulgate a regulation that founded CWA jurisdiction over any category of
environmental features upon something other than a hydrological connection with the navigable waters.107 The opinion in SWANCC emphasized that the crucial factor in determining the scope of CWA jurisdiction was the relationship between the object of regulation
and the cleanliness of the navigable waters. This opinion clarified that the CWA did not
provide wide-ranging authority to protect all aspects of aquatic ecosystems. Rather it was
designed to protect the navigable waters from pollution, and its reach could extend only to
“waters” that flowed to the navigable waters and could thereby convey pollution to the
navigable waters.
In addition, SWANCC made it clear that the hydrological connection upon which
CWA jurisdiction was based had to be “significant.” 108 A connection was significant for
CWA purposes when the condition of the non-navigable water or wetland would have a
significant effect on the cleanliness or biological integrity of the navigable waters. 109
SWANCC also supported the conclusion that a water would not be covered by the CWA if
it merely had some effect on an ecosystem that included a navigable water.110 Because the
CWA was concerned with water pollution, the nexus between a non-navigable water or
wetland and the navigable waters had to concern the cleanliness and biological integrity
of the navigable waters, not some other ecological factor.111
C.

Rapanos and the Ensuing Confusion over the Scope of Federal Authority

Five years after the decision in SWANCC, two consolidated cases from Michigan
presented a question about the meaning and application of the concept of “significant

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 168-69.
Id. at 171-72.
Id. at 167.
See id. (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134).
Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 167.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 167.
Id. at 168-69.
Id.
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nexus” in the context of CWA authority over wetlands “adjacent” to the navigable waters.112 These cases arose from the Army Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over several different kinds of wetlands, with varying types and degrees of connection to the navigable
waters. They provided an opportunity for the Court to conclusively assert the meaning of
SWANCC in the context of wetlands, but a division of opinion and analysis among the
Justices resulted in even less clarity than existed before.
In the first case, Rapanos v. United States,113 the Army Corps had asserted jurisdiction over “54 acres of land with sometimes-saturated soil conditions” near Midland, Michigan.114 The nearest body of navigable water was Saginaw Bay, an inlet of Lake Huron,
and it was between eleven and twenty miles from the land. 115 The landowner sought to
develop the property, and the Army Corps informed him that he would need a permit to
do so because the property included wetlands protected by the CWA. Disregarding the
assertion of federal jurisdiction, the land owner began backfilling the property without a
permit, and “[t]welve years of criminal and civil litigation ensued.” 116
In the second case, Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,117 a property
owner sought to develop a nineteen-acre parcel of land, which was about a mile from Lake
St. Clair, ironically the same body of navigable water involved in Riverside Bayview.118
The property qualified as a wetland because it collected standing water at certain times of
the year; and the standing water accumulated because ordinary run-off was prevented by
the existence of a man-made berm, which ran along the border of the property. 119 As the
Court explained, “[t]he berm is largely or entirely impermeable to water and blocks drainage from the wetland, though it may permit occasional overflow to the ditch. The ditch
empties into another ditch or a drain, which connects to Auvase Creek, which empties into
Lake St. Clair.”120
In both cases, the Army Corps had asserted jurisdiction because the wetlands were
adjacent to navigable waters, and the two district courts and the Sixth Circuit all agreed
that all of the wetlands involved in both cases fell within the definition of “adjacent” for
the purposes of the applicable regulations.121 John Rapanos argued that the CWA only
applied to waters that were actually navigable and therefore that its attendant regulations
could not assert jurisdiction over any wetlands, whether or not they were adjacent to the
navigable waters.122 The Carabells made a different argument, contending that the CWA

112. See United States v. Rapanos, 367 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Carabell v. United States Army Corps
of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases in
Rapanos v. United States, 546 U.S. 932 (2005). This paper will refer to the consolidated cases collectively as
“Rapanos.”
113. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
114. Id. at 720.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 721.
117. Carabell,547 U.S. at 715.
118. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 729-30.
122. Id. at 730-31.
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could not apply to a wetland that lacked any hydrological connection to the waters of the
United States.123
In a plurality opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia assailed the Army Corps for exceeding the limits of federal jurisdiction established by the use of the terms “navigable waters” and “waters of the
United States.”124
In applying the definition to “ephemeral streams,” “wet meadows,”
storm sewers and culverts, “directional sheet flow during storm events,”
drain tiles, manmade drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of
the desert, the Corps has stretched the term “waters of the United States”
beyond parody. The plain language of the statute simply does not authorize this “Land Is Waters” approach to federal jurisdiction.125
Justice Scalia’s opinion emphasized that, in both Riverside Bayview and SWANCC,
as well as in case law preceding those decisions, the Court had held that the phrase “waters
of the United States” has a limited effect, and that such a limited effect “includes, at bare
minimum, the ordinary presence of water.”126 Consequently, a non-navigable body of water or a wetland could fall within the definition of the “waters of the United States” only it
was joined to a navigable body of water by a regular, consistent flow of water. 127
Justice Scalia found this limitation in more than just the meaning of the specific
phrase “waters of the United States;” he also found it in general considerations of federalism, which were recognized elsewhere in the statute. In this connection, his plurality opinion pointed out that the CWA classifies channels that typically carry water currents intermittently as “point sources,” as distinct from the “navigable waters.”128 Justice Scalia read
this classification to denote that impermanent or intermittent flows of water, such as
“ephemeral streams,” “wet meadows,” storm sewers and culverts, “directional sheet flow
during storm events,” and others,129 must be distinguished from “navigable waters.”130
Moreover, this limited reading of federal authority under the CWA was important to preserving the traditional role of the states in regulating land and water use.131 In this connection, he pointed out that one of the stated purpose of the statute was to preserve the
traditional role of the states as the primary source of authority for both regulating land and
water use and preventing pollution. 132
This led the plurality to its conclusion about the scope of CWA jurisdiction over
wetlands. Justice Scalia explained:
[O]nly those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies
that are “waters of the United States” in their own right, so that there is

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739-40.
Id. at 734.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 734-35.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 735 (citing 33 U.S.C. at § 1362 (14) (1948).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
Id. at 737.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1948)).
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no clear demarcation between “waters” and wetlands, are “adjacent to”
such waters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an intermittent,
physically remote hydrologic connection to “waters of the United
States” do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside
Bayview, and thus lack the necessary connection to covered waters that
we described as a “significant nexus” in SWANCC . . . Thus, establishing that wetlands such as those at the Rapanos and Carabell sites are
covered by the Act requires two findings: first, that the adjacent channel
contains a “wate[r] of the United States,” (i. e., a relatively permanent
body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and
second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that
water, making it difficult to determine where the “water” ends and the
“wetland” begins.133
The plurality opinion effectively creates a two-part test for federal jurisdiction over
wetlands. First, the wetland in question must be “a relatively permanent body of water
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.” 134 Second, there must be a continuous surface connection between the wetland and the navigable interstate water. 135
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that stood in equipoise with Justice
Scalia’s majority opinion, commanding the votes of Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
Justice Stevens did not read the statutory language to be as specifically defined as Justice
Scalia had.136 Consequently, he concluded that terms such as “waters of the United States”
were broad enough to give agencies such as the Army Corps broad discretion in determining their meaning and application.137 And he thought that the Army Corps’ application of
the statute in Rapanos was within the boundaries of that discretionary authority.138 Thus,
Justice Stevens thought that the Army Corps’ implementation of the CWA fell within the
broad framework for judicial deference to agency action that was most authoritatively described in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.139
Justice Stevens’ path to Chevron deference began with his reading of the statutory
terms. Unlike Justice Scalia, he did not read “waters of the United States” as simply a legal
term of art, which is defined by its historical use by courts and legislatures.140 Rather,
Justice Stevens saw this statutory term as a reference to a complicated technical issue –
precisely the sort of technical issue that Congress typically delegates to agency interpretation and application in the Chevron framework.141 In this respect, Justice Stevens’ approach to the statute embraces the idea that “waters of the United States” really means
“ecosystems including the waters of the United States.” Thus, Justice Stevens concludes
that the statute calls for deference to the agency understanding of whether, how, and to
what extent a wetland affects an ecosystem that includes a navigable water.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 787-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 795-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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To support this conclusion, Justice Stevens asserted two principal points. First, he
noted the long history of congressional acquiescence to the Army Corps’ judgment about
what should and should not be included in the “waters of the United States.” 142 Second,
he noted that the Court’s decision in Riverside Bayview had specifically called for deference to reasonable determinations by the Army Corps about what fell within the scope of
CWA authority.143 As Justice Stevens read it, Riverside Bayview did not stand for the
proposition that a CWA jurisdiction depended upon the existence of a continuous surface
water connection; rather, he concluded that Riverside Bayview turned on the Court’s deference to the Army Corps’ judgment about what constituted a water of the United
States.144
The third main opinion in Rapanos was written by Justice Kennedy. Although he
agreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the Sixth Circuit had erred in affirming the
Army Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, thereby concurring in the judgment and creating a
five-vote majority for vacating the judgments below, he departed from Justice Scalia’s
understanding of the meaning of the statute. His opinion offered an approach to interpreting and applying the CWA that was a kind of combination of both Justice Scalia’s and
Justice Stevens’ approaches.
Justice Kennedy’s approach to defining CWA jurisdiction over wetlands focused on
the crucial concept from SWANCC: the “significant nexus” between a non-navigable water
or wetland and the navigable waters.145 As Justice Kennedy put it, the “wetland must possess a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.”146 According to Justice Kennedy, such a significant nexus would exist
“if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters
more readily understood as ‘navigable.’” 147
In those terms, Justice Kennedy’s understanding of “significant nexus” seemed compatible with Justice Scalia’s understanding in the sense that both emphasized the necessity
of a tangible, physical connection between the navigable waters and any other environmental feature that could be regulated under the CWA. But Justice Kennedy explicitly
rejected the requirement for a significant nexus that Justice Scalia had identified. 148 He
concluded that any requirement of a constantly flowing surface water connection had been
precluded by Riverside Bayview.149 In his reading of Riverside Bayview, it was irrelevant
whether wetlands share water with adjacent bodies of water so long as the wetlands significantly affect the ecosystem in which the navigable water belongs. 150 In other words,

142. Id. at 788.
143. Id. at 792-93 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123, 131-33).
144. Id. at 792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County,
531 U.S. at 167-68).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 780.
148. Id. at 772.
149. Id. at 772-73.
150. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772-73.
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Justice Kennedy thought that a “significant nexus” could be established by any of a number of factors beyond a regularly flowing surface water connection – adjacency, connection through an ecosystem, and perhaps others.151
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy concluded that an intermittently flowing
body of water could provide the requisite “significant nexus” between a wetland and the
navigable waters.152 According to his reading of the CWA, Justice Kennedy concluded
that Congress had not excluded such irregular flows from the “waters of the United
States.”153 In this connection, Justice Kennedy specifically rejected Justice Scalia’s definition of “point source” as a primarily intermittent flow of water, and therefore he rejected
Justice Scalia’s conclusion about the significance of this definition for understanding the
meaning of the broader term, “waters of the United States.”154 In particular, he rejected
the plurality opinion’s reasoning that, because a point source must possess an intermittent
flow, the waters of the United States must be strictly characterized by a continuous flow.
Justice Kennedy found this to be an unwarranted negative inference. 155
Like Justice Stevens, and unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy thought that the
determination of whether a particular wetland would meet these criteria was a decision for
the Army Corps, to be made on a case-by-case basis.156 The amount of deference that the
agency would get in making this determination was not entirely clear from Justice Kennedy’s analysis. On the one hand, he seemed to acknowledge the Army Corps’ authority
to make regulations that defined what a significant nexus could be. But, at the same time,
he also seemed to suggest that, at least under the existing regulations, the Army Corps’
answer to the question of whether a wetland would have a significant nexus to the navigable waters was subject to fairly extensive judicial scrutiny. Such ambiguity was apparent
when Justice Kennedy wrote:
When the Corps seeks to regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact
waters, it may rely on adjacency to establish its jurisdiction. Absent more
specific regulations, however, the Corps must establish a significant
nexus on a case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based
on adjacency to non-navigable tributaries. Given the potential overbreadth of the Corps’ regulations, this showing is necessary to avoid unreasonable applications of the statute. Where an adequate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it may be permissible, as a matter of
administrative convenience or necessity, to presume covered status for
other comparable wetlands in the region.157

151. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 769-70.
153. Id. at 770.
154. Id. at 771-72.
155. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772. As Justice Kennedy explained:
Nothing in the point-source definition requires an intermittent flow. Polluted water could flow night and day
from a pipe, channel, or conduit and yet still qualify as a point source; any contrary conclusion would likely
exclude, among other things, effluent streams from sewage treatment plants. As a result, even were the statute
read to require continuity of flow for navigable waters, certain water bodies could conceivably constitute both a
point source and a water. At any rate, as the dissent observes, the fact that point sources may carry continuous
flow undermines the plurality’s conclusion that covered “waters” under the Act may not be discontinuous.
156. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157. Id.
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In light of the analytical differences among the three opinions in Rapanos, and given
the fact that no single analytical approach commanded five votes, it is extremely difficult
to identify the holding. The simplest way to do so would be to follow the Supreme Court’s
own guidance about how to interpret its divided rulings. That guidance came in Marks v.
United States,158 where the Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred on the
narrowest grounds.’”159 But there is no significant commonality among any of the opinions in Rapanos. Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy appear to agree that the statutory language is the principal authority determining when a wetland can qualify as one of the
“waters of the United States.” But Justice Kennedy is willing to defer to the Army Corps,
to some extent, when it comes to making this determination. Justice Stevens agrees with
Justice Kennedy about deferring to the agency’s interpretation; but Justice Stevens would
follow Chevron principles in making that deference, and Justice Kennedy’s opinion does
not indicate that he would be quite so deferential. In the end, there is no core of common
principles that unites five Justices and that would permit a meaningful analysis of when a
wetland is within the jurisdiction of the CWA.
In his dissenting opinion in Rapanos, Justice Stevens seemed to recognize the difficulty posed by the Court’s internal disagreements, and he suggested an approach that
would not require a common core of principles for determining whether the Army Corps
has the authority under the CWA to regulate a wetland. Justice Stevens suggested that
lower courts should find jurisdiction under the CWA if either the plurality’s test or Justice
Kennedy’s test was satisfied.160 As Justice Stevens saw it, if a wetland would meet the
plurality’s test, it would certainly meet Justice Kennedy’s test.161
D.

Post-Rapanos Caselaw Regarding the Scope of Federal Authority

Case law decided after Rapanos demonstrates that there is no clear rule governing
the application of the CWA to wetlands. A number of cases follow Justice Kennedy’s
approach, and, many of these courts employ the Marks method for deriving a holding from
Rapanos’ fractured ruling.162 Other courts have followed Justice Stevens’ suggestion of
an “either/or” test that used both the approach of the plurality and the approach set forth
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.163
In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc.,164 the Seventh Circuit applied Rapanos,
although not in a wetlands case. That case arose from the unpermitted discharge of pollutants into waters by Gerke Excavating, Inc.165 To determine if the waters were covered by

158. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
159. Id.. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976)).
160. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id.
162. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 72425 (7th Cir. 2006).
163. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006).
164. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006)
165. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 723.
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the CWA, the Seventh Circuit applied Rapanos for the first time.166 Applying the Marks
analysis for fractured Supreme Court opinions, the Seventh Circuit held that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test was the controlling rationale in Rapanos because it was the
“narrowest” grounds for decision. 167 In this connection, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that “narrowest” meant imposing the smallest restriction on the scope of federal authority.168 The court also made an interesting observation about the differences between the
plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s opinion, noting that in cases in which a “slight
surface hydrological connection” could be found, Justice Kennedy’s test would not find
federal jurisdiction, though eight other Justices would find federal jurisdiction. 169
In Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg,170 the Ninth Circuit followed Justice Kennedy’s approach. This case arose from facts similar to those in Gerke
Excavating: the discharging of sewage into Basalt Pond, which is adjacent to the Russian
River, a navigable water.171 Without much analysis, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Gerke Excavating to conclude that Justice
Kennedy’s test was “the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would assent
if forced to choose in almost all cases.” 172
The Eleventh Circuit applied Rapanos in United States v. Robison.173 As with the
preceding Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases, the defendant in Robison violated a permit by
discharging pollutants from undesignated points in its plant in Birmingham, Alabama. 174
Like the preceding courts, the Robison Court applied Marks and concluded that Justice
Kennedy’s test controlled.175 In this connection, the court pointed out that courts may look
to concurring opinions when interpreting a plurality opinion because concurring opinions
have joined in the Court’s decision.176 It also followed the Seventh Circuit in determining
that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is the narrowest one because it will make the
smallest incursion on federal authority and thereby impose the least limitation on the scope
of the CWA’s application.177
The First Circuit departed from this trend in United States v. Johnson,178 adopting
Justice Stevens’ either/or approach to applying the reasoning of the Rapanos plurality and
concurrence. In that case, a group of Massachusetts cranberry farmers released pollutants
into three wetlands that were hydrologically connected to the Weweantic River. 179 The
First Circuit decided that Rapanos was the controlling authority for the jurisdictional issue,
but the more difficult question for the court was how that case would apply.180
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 724.
Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
Id. at 724-25.
Id. at 725.
N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007)
Id. at 995.
Id. at 999.
Robison, 505 F.3d 1208.
Id. at 1211-12.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1221-22.
Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 62-64.
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After considering the Marks analysis at length, the First Circuit determined that its
method was not particularly useful because there was no real “narrowest ground” among
any of the opinions.181 Indeed, the First Circuit noted that the concept of “narrowest
ground” was elusive, even in the best of circumstances. 182 As the court noted, “narrowest
ground” could mean, as the Seventh Circuit concluded, the ground that is least restrictive
of federal authority, but it could also mean the ground that is least restrictive of non-federal
interest.183 By the same token, it could mean the ground that is “more closely tailored to
the specific situation confronting the court.” 184
Turning away from Marks, the First Circuit followed what it called the “common
sense approach to fragmented opinions.”185 In had found this approach in a Second Circuit
opinion, Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,186 which held that the court must “find [the] common ground shared by five or more justices,” not simply the single opinion in which a
majority of justices joined.187 According to this method, a lower court confronted with a
fragment Supreme Court opinion must find “a legal standard which, when applied, will
necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would
agree.”188
When it applied this method, the First Circuit concluded that Justice Stevens’s either/
or test would most often reach the result that would command the assent of a majority of
the members of the Rapanos Court.189 The First Circuit noted that this test would solve
the problem that was identified—but left unresolved—by the Seventh Circuit in Gerke
Excavating.190
The Fifth Circuit also used Justice Stevens’ either/or method, albeit for different
reasons, in United States v. Lucas.191 There, a Mississippi property owner who anticipated
selling parcels of his land to mobile home owners had installed septic systems on his property, in accordance with county ordinances. 192 The land included wetlands that were connected to the Bayou Costapia, the Tchoutacabouffa River, and eventually the Gulf of Mexico.193 The Fifth Circuit affirmed jury instructions that reflected elements of both Justice
Kennedy’s significant nexus test and the plurality opinion’s test that focused on a continuous surface water connection.194 These instructions required the jury to find that the wetlands in question were waters of the United States if they contained a significant nexus
with adjacent navigable waters such that the wetlands had a notable effect on the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the navigable waters. 195 In addition, in making this
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id.
Johnson, 467 F.3d at 62-64.
Id. at 63 (citing Johnson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir.)).
Id. at 64.
Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (2nd Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1182.
Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64-65.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 322.
Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 323-24.
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finding, the jury was allowed to take into consideration the “flow rate of surface water
between the wetlands” and the navigable waters. 196
All of these different approaches show that Rapanos did little to clarify the law.
Nearly a decade after it was decided, the lower courts are still uncertain about the extent
of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands. And they are equally uncertain about the proper approach to interpreting the statute.
IV. THE NEW REGULATIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH CASE LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERALISM
The new regulations promulgated by the EPA and the Army Corps in 2015 were a
long-awaited response to the uncertainly left in the wake of the divided analyses and opinions in Rapanos. But the new regulations proved controversial. In particular, they inspired
opposition because they seemed to embrace the expansive conception of CWA jurisdiction, which had been severely criticized in SWANCC and the plurality opinion in Rapanos.
The strongest arguments against the regulations are reflected by the allegations made by
Ohio and Michigan in their challenge to the implementation of those regulations.
In their complaint for injunctive relief, Ohio and Michigan alleged that the new definition of “waters of the United States” was inconsistent with SWANCC because it would
apply to “isolated, intrastate waters,” which SWANCC ruled could not be included in the
definition of “waters of the United States.”197 They also alleged that the proposed regulations were inconsistent with important principles shared by both the plurality and concurring opinions in Rapanos.198 In particular, they contended that, when viewed together, the
plurality and concurring opinions prohibited the extension of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands that were remote from bodies of navigable water and were adjacent only to remote
and insubstantial ditches and drains.199 Moreover, they maintained that the new regulations were based upon principles articulated by the dissenting opinion in Rapanos and
therefore were inconsistent with the controlling legal prinicples set forth in that opinion
and in preceding opinions such as SWANCC and Riverside Bayview.200 As the states asserted in their complaint:
[T]he Rule appears informed far more by the dissent in Rapanos than by
the four-Justice plurality or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence: indeed, Defendants’ Technical Support Document (at pages 37-40) in its introductory discussion of “Supreme Court Decisions” devotes five paragraphs
and two and one-half pages to a fulsome discussion of the Rapanos dissent, while giving just one short-shrift paragraph each (and a total of one
page) to the plurality and the Kennedy concurrence. 201
In arguing that the new regulations exceeded existing federal authority, Ohio and
Michigan emphasized that the scope of federal power to prevent pollution was limited by

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Lucas, 516 F.3d at 324.
Id. at ¶¶ 32-33.
Id. at ¶¶ 35-42.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.
Lucas, 516 F.3d at ¶ 34.
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the principle that the regulation of intrastate land is quintessentially a matter of state
power.202 The states took the position that the new regulations extended federal power to
many areas of intrastate land that were not actually adjacent to waters that had been traditionally subject to federal regulation.203 Thus, the states contended that the new regulations were not within the scope of the authority created by the CWA and were not consistent with the constitutional limits on federal power. 204 Thus, they asserted causes of
action for a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act205 and the Tenth Amendment.206
In making its initial ruling in the case, the Sixth Circuit seemed persuaded by the
arguments against the regulation.207 Responding to the challengers’ arguments that the
new regulation was unlawful in both substantive and procedural terms, the Sixth Circuit
held:
[W]e conclude that petitioners have demonstrated a substantial possibility of success on the merits of their claims. Petitioners first claim that
the Rule’s treatment of tributaries, “adjacent waters,” and waters having
a “significant nexus” to navigable waters is at odds with the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Rapanos, where the Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s
upholding of wetlands regulation by the Army Corps of Engineers. Even
assuming, for present purposes, as the parties do, that Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Rapanos represents the best instruction on the permissible
parameters of “waters of the United States” as used in the Clean Water
Act, it is far from clear that the new Rule’s distance limitations are harmonious with the instruction.
Moreover, the rulemaking process by which the distance limitations
were adopted is facially suspect. Petitioners contend the proposed rule
that was published, on which interested persons were invited to comment, did not include any proposed distance limitations in its use of
terms like “adjacent waters” and significant nexus.” Consequently, petitioners contend, the Final Rule cannot be considered a “logical outgrowth” of the rule proposed, as required to satisfy the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553. See Long Island Care
at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 168 L. Ed.
2d 54 (2007). As a further consequence of this defect, petitioners contend, the record compiled by respondents is devoid of specific scientific
support for the distance limitations that were included in the Final Rule.
They contend the Rule is therefore not the product of reasoned decisionmaking and is vulnerable to attack as impermissibly “arbitrary or capricious” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).208

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at ¶¶ 42-49.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 45-50.
Id. at ¶¶ 51-58.
Lucas, 516 F.3d at ¶¶ 59-62,
Ohio, 803 F.3d at 807.
Id.
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On this basis, the Sixth Circuit ordered that the new regulations be stayed pending
further review.209 This analysis by the Sixth Circuit, however brief, buttresses the idea that
those who challenge the new regulatory definitions have a strong case to make.
The best argument against the new regulations is that they are simply inconsistent
with the main line of case law interpreting the CWA, and, in particular, with SWANCC
and the concept of the “significant nexus” that was outlined there. The crucial analytical
point made in SWANCC was that the CWA jurisdiction is limited to “waters” with a substantial and tangible physical connection with the navigable waters. 210 This point was
based upon the entire line of cases involving questions about the scope of federal authority
to regulate water resources.211 An intangible or intermittent connection through an aquatic
ecosystem is simply not enough to serve as a basis for a federal intrusion into an area
traditionally reserved for state and local regulation. 212
But the new regulations provide for just such intangible or intermittent ecosystem
connections.213 By explicitly asserting federal jurisdiction over ephemeral streams, intermittent water flows, or even areas that are only within a 100-year floodplain of the navigable waters, the new regulations base significant elements of federal jurisdiction entirely
on the kind of ecosystem connections that were ruled insufficient in SWANCC. The same
principles and analysis that led to the invalidation of the Migratory Bird Rule in SWANCC
also undermine the validity of the new regulations.
Despite the disparity of analytical approaches in Rapanos, these essential principles
from SWANCC and before remain untouched. There is certainly no doubt that Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion emphasized the important of regularly flowing surface water
connections as the sine qua non of CWA jurisdiction.214 Although Justice Kennedy’s concurrence concluded that CWA jurisdiction was not quite so limited as Justice Scalia would
have had it, he retained focus on the importance of the “significant nexus” and reaffirmed
the dispositive principles of SWANCC.215 Although Justice Kennedy’s analysis left some
room for agencies to identify what constituted a “significant nexus,” there is nothing in his
opinion to suggest that he embraced the same level of deference to agency decision-making advocated by Justice Stevens in his dissent or that he was willing to tolerate an agency
interpretation that was squarely at odds with SWANCC. In other words, although Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence identified a slightly broader meaning for “significant nexus” than
Justice Scalia’s plurality, it was still based on the principles of SWANCC that forbid the
establishment of CWA jurisdiction on intangible ecosystem connections.
In fact, the new regulations seem entirely based upon the approach advocated by
Justice Stevens’ dissent. Most notably, they presume that Justice Stevens prevailed when
advocating for extensive deference to agency findings about when a “water” had a significant nexus with the navigable waters; as Ohio and Michigan point out in their complaint,

209. Id.
210. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 172-73.
211. See supra § III.
212. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 172-73.
213. See supra § III.
214. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734-35.
215. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at
167-68).
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the EPA’s and Army Corps’ guidance on the new regulations rely heavily on the dissenting
opinion in Rapanos and barely mention the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence at all.216 The agencies are rather aggressive in asserting their authority to interpret
the CWA and to extend federal jurisdiction to areas it has never invaded before, even
though Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion is the first and only authority supporting the
idea that the agencies should have such sweeping discretionary authority.
Not only do the new regulations exceed the legal boundaries defined by established
law, they also comprise important principles of federalism. Because they would extend
federal jurisdiction over areas with 100-year floodplains, they will give the federal government the potential to control land and water use in virtually every corner of every state.
Indeed, when combined with the agencies’ self-appointed discretionary authority, the new
regulations could make the EPA and the Army Corps the primary arbiters of whether any
new development or land use should go forward. There is simply no precedent in American
law for such a compromise of powers traditionally conferred upon state and local governments. Moreover, state and local governments are simply better suited to make land use
decisions that take into account all relevant factors, not just environmental ones. Simply
put, the CWA is not—and was not intended to be—and instrument for making water pollution control the pre-eminent consideration in all matters of land use and development in
every corner of the nation.
CONCLUSION
One of the core principles of federalism is that a division of authority between the
state and federal governments is essential to assure both fair and efficient government.
The newly proposed regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” compromises
these principles because it would give the federal government essentially unlimited power
to regulate land and water use. This expansion of federal authority is not only inconsistent
with constitutional principles, but is also inconsistent with the body of law that developed
surrounding the scope of federal authority to regulate water use, which has developed both
before and after the enactment of the CWA. Under that body of law, the “waters of the
United States” have always been understood to consist of those bodies of water that are or
can be navigated, along with any tributaries that have a substantial, physical connection to
such bodies of water. This definition of “waters of the United States” leaves room for the
states to assume their traditional role of regulating land and water use, while permitting
the federal government to protect those resources of genuinely national scope. Because the
CWA is limited to the regulation of the “waters of the United States,” and because the new
regulations would greatly expand the scope of federal authority beyond the established
definition of “waters of the United States,” those new regulations are unlawful and should
be overturned.
Those who support the new regulatory definition of “waters of the United States”
may argue that this expansive definition is necessary to protect the entire ecosystem that
supports the biological integrity of the navigable waters. This may well be true, but the
Clean Water Act was not drafted as legislation for the protection of aquatic ecosystems.

216. Complaint, supra note 25, at ¶ 34.
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As its language unequivocally demonstrates, it was drafted for the purpose of preventing
the flow of pollution into the navigable waters. If the protection of aquatic ecosystems is
an important national policy objective, it should be the subject of its own legislation,
drafted on the basis of language that is not fraught with the limitations inherent in the
concept of “waters of the United States.”
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